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Conference themes, rhetoric, and commentary have emphasized the na-
ture of dramatic change in the banking industry for so long that it has
become one of the cliche ´s that dominate our professional lives. The reality
of change in banking—signiﬁcant and dramatic change—has become,
well, humdrum. It has, in fact, become so well understood and so real that
Congress has ﬁnally enacted ﬁnancial modernization legislation. This is
not a cheap shot. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modern-
ization Act was a massive and complicated eﬀort to make the legal struc-
ture consistent with the new reality while accommodating the myriad of
new and old interests aﬀected by the economic and legislative changes.
Arguably, the legislation, to a considerable degree, validated law changes
that had already occurred—or were soon to occur—in the marketplace
with the aid of both loopholes and regulatory actions. Nevertheless, it is
worth emphasizing that structural and other eﬃciency gains brought
about by statutory revision are important in and of themselves.
The supervisory response to change—the real theme, I hope, of this
conference—is quite another matter. That is to say, the oﬃcial response of
the banking agencies to the changes in banking is, I think, incomplete. To
be sure, we have made some real progress with risk-focused examinations
that recognize the reality that eﬀective risk management systems are criti-
cal to the safe operation of a modern bank. Similarly, using models to de-
termine capital for market risk on traded securities and derivative posi-
tions is another genuine step forward.
Despite these advances, however, our capital rules have been under-
mined by the state of the art. The one-size-ﬁts-all risk weight for credit
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regulatory capital exceeds economic capital. At the same time, banks have
taken advantage of being undercharged for capital for loans with above-
average risk. The result has been that banks have placed a greater empha-
sis on unproductive capital arbitrage schemes and bank capital ratios that
are signiﬁcantly less relevant and informative than intended. Indeed, as
banks become more adept at internal risk classiﬁcations, their incentives
to arbitrage economic and regulatory capital can only increase, and regu-
latory capital will carry less and less meaning.
In addition, the growing scale and complexity of our largest banking
organizations—and, I might add, not only ours but also those of many
other nations—raise as never before the potential for systemic risk from a
signiﬁcant disruption in (let alone failure of) one of these institutions. We
seem, in this regard, to face the unattractive options of exposing our econ-
omies to additional risk in order to obtain ﬁnancial eﬃcienciesandmarket
choices or of imposing more regulation with both its attendant moral haz-
ard and ineﬃciencies.
Bank supervisors have been trying to respond to this new reality—to
adapt to change, as it were. The response is taking longer than we wish.
But it is important to get our response as right as we can because so much
is at stake.
At the Federal Reserve System, we are working through three major
channels: through the evolution of the Fed’s supervisory practices in coop-
eration with the other banking agencies; through the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, where we meet with oﬃcials from other G10 coun-
tries; and through work in a Fed-based group called the F-6, which I chair.
Much of the eﬀort in each case is directed at what we call the large complex
banking organizations (LCBOs). By talking of F-6s and LCBOs, I’m about
to share with you some of the secrets of the temple. You, too, will soon be
able to talk the talk of the central banker by spicing your conversation
with the same catchwords.
Before I discuss the evolution in supervisory practice in the Federal Re-
serve and other agencies, let me brieﬂy note the highlights of our work
with the Basel supervisors’ committee, for this work sets the stage for some
of the issues I want to discuss with you. For those of you interested in the
economics of bank supervision, the research of Dave Jones and John
Mingo on capital arbitrage, Mark Carey and Bill Treacy on internal risk
classiﬁcations, and Mark Flannery and Charlie Calomiris on market disci-
pline contributed importantly to the work on improving the international
accord in Basel.
As you know, the evolving consensus of the Basel supervisors is to base
a new accord on the so-called three pillars of capital, supervision, and
market discipline. More speciﬁcally, the capital pillar—at least for larger
banks, as I will discuss momentarily—is to be designed so as to link regu-
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their own internal management. Large banks already have been directed
by the Fed to create internal risk classiﬁcation systems for such purposes,
and cutting-edge banks have made substantial progress. We fully antici-
pate that within the next decade or sooner, these systems will evolve into
full internal risk models that could be used to measure market and credit
risks throughout large banks.
Bankers do not want their institutions to fail and—with the exception of
periodswhenfailuremaybecloseathand—neverplantotakeexcessiverisk
withinadequatecapital.Theywill,nodoubt,striveontheirowntoestablish
strong and meaningful internal risk classiﬁcation systems and internal risk
models. But the second pillar (supervision) is to be used in a trust-but-
verify mode. That is, a major role of supervision will be to independently
test and compare systems and models to best practices. This is already oc-
curringattheFedandtheOﬃceoftheComptrolleroftheCurrency(OCC).
Although supervisory reviews of risk management systems will become
even more important in the years ahead, they are not enough by them-
selves. As large banking institutions become increasingly complex—and
fund themselves more from noninsured sources—market discipline and its
prerequisite, public disclosure, must play a greater role. Indeed, increased
transparency and market discipline can also help substantially to address
concerns about increased systemic risk associated with ever-larger institu-
tions and to avoid the potentially greater moral hazard associated with
more intrusive supervision and regulation.
The ediﬁce that these pillars are to support is not designed to cover all
banks in the United States. For most, the existing system works just ﬁne
with only minor modiﬁcations and probably will continue to do so for the
foreseeable future. Rather, the ediﬁce covers the LCBOs that engage in
capital arbitrage and often operate at the edge of the envelope in risk-
return tradeoﬀs and in the creation of new instruments and strategies.
Thus, the U.S. banking agencies have been strong supporters of bifurcation
in the Basel deliberations—central bankese for having separate policy ap-
plications for large banks and other banks.
Indeed, the OCC has had a large bank program for some time, and the
Fed has established a separate supervisory arrangement for LCBOs. The
Fed has designated about thirty entities—accounting for about 60 percent
of total U.S. bank assets—as LCBOs. The number and distribution of
these organizations will no doubt change over time; one-third, by the way,
are now foreign owned—a fact that vividly highlights the globalization
of banking. Each LCBO has a designated team of Federal Reserve super-
visors whose job is to understand thoroughly the organization’s business
strategy, management structure, key policies, and risk control systems.
Each team is led by a senior examiner who is designated a central point
of contact (CPC). The CPC and his or her team of examiners draw on
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ing, information technology, and other technical areas.
I’ve already mentioned the increasing emphasis of the OCC and the Fed
on the largest banking organizations as well as our emphasis on examining
and evaluating risk management systems. In addition, in summer 1999 the
Fed established a supervisory policy requiring LCBOs to evaluate their
capital relative to their internal risk evaluations. Jointly with other agen-
cies, we have also established policies on the use of synthetic credit instru-
ments in securitizations and will soon announce a policy on asset sales
with recourse. All of these eﬀorts are designed to limit the disproportionate
reduction in regulatory capital requirements that might otherwise occur.
The Fed is also dealing with implications arising from changing market
structures through senior-level ad hoc groups. During the past year, for
example, the Fed formed the F-6 group to study the systemic implications
of changing banking markets. The group was originally composed of three
Federal Reserve governors and three Reserve Bank presidents and chaired
by me. Along the way, we added a fourth president but didn’t change
the name. The F-numbered ad hoc groups, with the number depending
on size, have existed from time to time for the last ten years or so and
began when a governor decided to make a bit of sport of the various
G-designated groups that meet internationally. Now you know all of our
secrets!
During 1999, the current F-6 commissioned and reviewed several stud-
ies that have played a signiﬁcant role in shaping our evolving supervisory
policy. These studies addressed issues involving systemic risk, the potential
regulatory role of subordinated debentures, the value of public disclosure,
staﬀ resource needs for supervising LCBOs, and other supervisory issues.
I would like to discuss some of these topics in greater detail.
3.1 Public Disclosure
Greater public disclosure at LCBOs is an idea whose time has come. As
my colleagues and I struggled with the complexities of capital reform in
Basel, the systemic concerns of increasing scale and concentration, the
rising weight of the C in LCBO, the burden and moral hazard of additional
supervision and regulation, and the accelerated speed with which markets
respond to shock, we concluded that harnessing markets to work in our
behalf was a necessity, not a choice. And, as I have already noted, markets
cannot operate well without transparency. Put another way, the prerequi-
site for market discipline is more rapid dissemination of information by
the regulators and, more importantly, the direct provision to market par-
ticipants of critical and timely information about risk exposures by the
LCBOs themselves.
We are painfully aware of a potentially diﬃcult downside to public dis-
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surprise. As one of my colleagues notes, the good news is that market
discipline will work, and the bad news is that market discipline will work.
That risk is there but it needs to be balanced by the ex ante change in
bank behavior that expanded public disclosure will induce. We should also
consider that more disclosure will induce changes in funding costs when
individual banks take on more risk. Such responses should increase bank
safety and soundness and reduce risks and surprises.
Market discipline is not, of course, the only instrument for disciplining
banks’ risk-taking; it may not even be the strongest pillar among the three.
But I have great expectations that it will become an eﬀective supplement
to the supervisory process. I also hope that it will, at least to some extent,
substitute for additional future regulation, if not permit a reduction in
regulation. However, if public disclosure does not induce meaningful mar-
ket discipline, there could be signiﬁcant additional regulation—and more
intrusive supervision—as organizations increase in scale and complexity.
A public version of the staﬀ F-6 paper on public disclosure will be pub-
lished by the Board in a month or so. It documents the signiﬁcant amount
of public disclosure that already occurs at LCBOs, makes a case that cur-
rent disclosure is not suﬃcient, and suggests examples of kinds of disclo-
sures that might be helpful for the problem at hand. They relate to the
residual risks held in securitizations, the distribution of credits by internal
risk classiﬁcation, and concentrations of credits by industry, geography,
and borrower. As an aside, we understand that the work that the Fed has
published to date on internal systems for credit risk classiﬁcation and on
analyses of economic capital has been actively sought out by rating agen-
cies, investors, and analysts who have repeatedly expressed strong support
for more meaningful disclosure about bank risk proﬁles.
Let me underline that we are still developing the LCBO public disclo-
sure initiative, and we hope to engage senior bank executives in helping us
design the program. We are fairly far along in designing what we have in
mind, but it is very much a work in progress. Let me share with you our
conceptual framework.
At least initially, we are limiting application of the program to the
LCBOs. For the domestic LCBOs, only a little more than half of the organ-
izations’ worldwide consolidated assets are funded from deposits, and not
all of their deposits are insured; 42 percent of assets are funded by nonde-
posit debt, and 7 percent by equity. Market discipline thus has a potential
for signiﬁcant impact. I noted that one-third of the LCBOs are foreign-
chartered banks. Any U.S. disclosure policy would apply to only the U.S.
operations of foreign-chartered banks, but to the consolidated worldwide
operations of U.S.-chartered organizations.
Even though there are only about thirty LCBOs, a one-size-ﬁts-all dis-
closure requirement simply would not work. The strategies, business
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diverse and rapidly changing. Rather than imposing a predetermined set
of statistics and reporting schedules for all LCBOs, we may require some
reverse engineering tailored for each bank. Each LCBO might be asked to
disclose information on the frequency and at the level of detail that would
be necessary for uninsured creditors and other stakeholders to evaluate
that LCBO’s unique risk proﬁle.
Lest you conclude that this is some voluntary eﬀort that LCBOs could
meet in principle, but not in fact, let me make three observations. First, I
hope that the Fed and the banking community can jointly develop a best-
practices standard for public disclosure. Second, a best-practices standard
will, it seems clear, place considerable market pressure on all LCBOs (as
well as other large banks) to disclose similar kinds of information. Third,
examiners will be reviewing an LCBO’s disclosures to conﬁrm that the
organization’s policy is consistent with best practices and to conﬁrm that
the bank’s actual disclosures are consistent with its own policy.
Public disclosure is not going to be easy for bankers because it may well
bring new pressures that they may not like in the short run. It is not going
to be easy on creditors and other stakeholders because they will have some
tough analyses to do, although it will greatly help them to do a more eﬀec-
tive job. It is not going to be easy on examiners because they will have to
make some tough judgments. But the alternatives—more supervision and
regulation—are not easy either.
3.2 Subordinated Debentures
Beyond the broad public disclosure eﬀort, Charlie Calomiris has helped
focus attention on the potential for subordinated debentures as a way of
increasing the degree of market discipline in banking. Charlie has a quite
speciﬁc proposal in mind, but I would like to address a more generic model
that is applicable to LCBOs. That broader model—built around the issu-
ance of investment-grade unsecured long-term debt—is now almost re-
quired by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and is one of the hoops through
which large banks must jump if they want to operate securities subsidiaries
of the bank. In December 1999, the Board published a staﬀ study, under
the direction of Myron Kwast and drawn from a paper for the F-6, that
analyzes the potential for using subordinated debt as an instrument of
market discipline. And the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires the Treasury
and the Fed to conduct a joint study evaluating the use of mandatory
subordinated debentures for large banks and ﬁnancial holding companies.
Let me just highlight some of the reasons policymakers might be inter-
ested in requiring LCBOs to make subordinated debentures a part of (or
a supplement to) Tier 2 capital requirements. Of course, the general prin-
ciple from which all else ﬂows is that these instruments would provide a
102 Laurence H. Meyermarket signal of the perceived riskiness of the issuer—directly at the time
of issue and indirectly in its secondary market price. These instruments
are particularly relevant because the holders have interests similar to those
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Subordinated debt holders
have an interest in discouraging excessive risk taking because their claims
are both long-term and junior to all depositors and any senior debt hold-
ers, and they share in upside potential in very limited ways. If the train
crashes, the subordinated debt holders sit not in the caboose but in the
cab of the engine. They are thus quite sensitive to the speed of the train
and the quality of the tracks.
Another factor supporting the regulatory use of subordinated deben-
tures is that the market is already well established: Thirty-six of the ﬁfty
largest bank holding companies have such instruments outstanding and
held by third parties today; eight of the ﬁfty largest banks do as well. The
market is well deﬁned and homogenous. Rates on outstanding instruments
adjust promptly to events, and the market appears to monitor the spreads
across issuers closely. Issuers disclose considerable information at the time
of issuance, and such disclosure refreshes secondary market prices.
There are several things we do not yet know. We do not know if the
market behavior of these instruments provides information to supervisors
that they do not already appreciate, if such information is provided earlier
than from other sources, or if it is simply conﬁrming. We do not yet have
a good understanding of how much additional market discipline would
be provided by mandatory subordinated debt relative to equity, voluntary
subordinated debt, and other uninsured liabilities. The F-6 has asked the
staﬀ to study these and related matters, and that eﬀort is under way. In
a d d i t i o n ,w eh a v ea s k e dt h es t a ﬀ to help us resolve some thorny analytical
and practical questions. Would a mandatory policy provide greater advan-
tages than current market practices? If there were a mandatory policy,
should it apply to banks or to holding companies? Which banks or holding
companies? Should it be a part of Tier 2 requirements or a supplement?
What should be the required minimum? How frequently should issuance
be required? What sort of issuance ﬂexibility should be permitted, espe-
cially at times of market or individual bank stress?
Although the Fed is not committed to a speciﬁcp o l i c ya sy e t ,m yo w n
view is that subordinated debt will be shown to be quite useful as a supple-
ment to supervision, especially in conjunction with a broader program
of additional public disclosure and greater reliance on market discipline.
Perhaps we should not expect too much from these instruments, taken
alone, but I think they could be a useful part of a broader program.
Let me end this discussion of subordinated debt and public disclosure
by noting and underlining an obvious point. None of this will be worth
the eﬀort—indeed, will not work—unless the market believes that the au-
thorities will refuse to rescue uninsured creditors of failed or reorganized
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ment and its agencies demonstrate it by their actual behavior.
3.3 Other Issues
With my eye on the clock, let me brieﬂy mention a couple of other items
that the F-6 has reviewed in recent months.
Decentralization is fundamental to the culture of the Federal Reserve
System, and I have been impressed by how beneﬁcial it is for obtaining
intelligence about banking, ﬁnancial markets, and the macro- and micro-
economy. The presidents, their boards of directors, and the staﬀs of the
Reserve Banks are invaluable for providing the Fed with an understanding
of what is going on and helping ensure that the policies developed in
Washington are meaningful and relevant.
Nonetheless, the lack of congruity between the geographical distribu-
tion of banks and Federal Reserve Districts creates the potential for a
maldistribution of resources: Not every District can aﬀord to maintain the
expert specialists that are required to examine the LCBOs for which they
are responsible, and other Districts may be allocating their experts on Dis-
trict assignments with a lower national priority. Therefore, to ensure rea-
sonable resource allocations consistent with Fed priorities, and as a result
of our F-6 discussions, we are in the process of recruiting a staﬀ coordina-
tor to facilitate the allocation of scarce staﬀ experts at all the Reserve
Banks to the highest Fed priority in LCBO exams.
Another important issue involves the cooperation and coordination
among the many ﬁnancial services supervisors with complementary and
sometimes overlapping responsibilities within banking organizations. The
wider scope of ﬁnancial activities for banking organizations authorized
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has made this an increasingly important
concern. There are potential tensions in the interaction between the Fed-
eral Reserve as umbrella supervisor, on the one hand, and the specialized
functional regulators of nonbank activities—the Security and Exchange
Commission and the state insurance commissioners—on the other. More-
over, the increased complexity of banking organizations requires improved
cooperation and coordination between the Federal Reserve as umbrella
supervisor and the primary bank supervisors, particularly the OCC, given
that most LCBOs have lead banks with national charters.
One ﬁnal issue. As a matter of prudent contingency planning, the F-6
reviewed the implications of changes in markets and ﬁnancial structure for
central bank management of LCBO failures. The review made clear that
the speed of ﬁnancial market reactions to shocks has increased greatly.
This faster response reﬂects globalization, information technology, banks’
increased emphasis on short-term nondeposit funding and securitization
by banking organizations, the greater participation in dealing and hedging
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organizations. At the same time, statutory and policy reforms have limited
the options available for addressing diﬃculties at individual institutions,
although I hasten to add that the tools available for macropolicy and short-
term assistance to individual institutions remain unchanged.
My colleagues and I carried away from this review a greater apprecia-
tion of the need for contingency planning by bank management for sig-
niﬁcant disruptions—including the sale of units and business lines and
more active participation by outside directors. In addition, the review em-
phasized the need for supervisors to be ready and willing to intervene ag-
gressively and rapidly when signiﬁcant diﬃculties occur. As a result, we
are in the process of reviewing and implementing a series of technical rec-
ommendations to facilitate the resolution of a problem or failing bank by
regulatory agencies.
Although such actions are needed, the analysis and discussion of these
issues have greatly reinforced my view that we must rely more on market
discipline in an eﬀort to create ex ante conditions that minimize excessive
risk taking and provide supervisors with rapid signals when there are
diﬃculties.
3.4 Conclusion
As I consider how to end my remarks today, I am reminded of the story
about the time Chico Marx was playing a zippy little melody on the piano
in Groucho’s presence. It went on and on, repeating the same silly little
tune with what seemed to be neverending regularity. Chico observed,
“That’sf u n n y ,Ic a n ’t think of how to end this.” To which Groucho re-
sponded, “That’s funny, that’s all I can think about.”
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